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ABSTRACT  
Knowledge management initiatives are less likely to be successful if knowledge repositories do not provide high-quality 
knowledge assets.  Two mechanisms employed by organizations to ensure knowledge quality are using experts to control or 
edit users’ contributions (such as in a refereed repository), and using a community of users to review, rate, or edit existing 
contributions (such as in a community-driven wiki).  The goal of this paper is to explore these two mechanisms by drawing 
upon the concept of societal governance from sociology, identify the conditions under which they are preferable, and discuss 
their impact on how users contribute to and reuse information from knowledge repositories.  Propositions are suggested and 
implications are discussed. 
Keywords  
Governance, hierarchical control, refereed repository, community-governance, community-governance, community-governed 
repository. 
INTRODUCTION 
The number of organizations that implement knowledge management (KM) systems to increase efficiency and effectiveness 
of organizational practices for competitive advantage is on the rise (Davenport, Prusak and Strong, 2008).  In order for 
organizations to enjoy the benefits of these KM initiatives, knowledge repositories must provide high-quality, timely, and 
reliable knowledge assets (Schuler, 1994).  Two of the most frequently used approaches to satisfying this need are: (1) using 
experts or supervisors as referees to control or edit users’ contributions (such as in a refereed repository); and (2) using a 
community of users to review, rate, or edit existing contributions (such as in a community-driven wiki). 
Drawing upon the sociological literature, these two approaches can be referred to as expert-governance (i.e., hierarchical 
control), and community-governance respectively.  Although most knowledge repositories are governed using one of the two 
mechanisms, our understanding of them is still rather limited.  First, we don’t know which governance mechanism is better 
and under what circumstances, even though most organizations tend to prefer community-governance (c.f., McKinsey, 2008).  
Second, we don’t know the impact of these governance mechanisms on knowledge contribution and reuse, without which 
KM initiatives cannot be sustained (Ba, Statlaert and Whinston, 2001).  Therefore, the goal of this paper is to address these 
concerns by investigating the following research questions: (1) which governance mechanism is preferred when; (2) how do 
governance mechanisms impact knowledge contribution and reuse?   
Investigating these research questions makes two theoretical contributions to the existing body of research.  First, we 
introduce the concept of governance to the KM literature, and advance our understanding of the mechanisms with which 
knowledge assets can be rendered more valuable.  The governance concept promises to provide further insights in other 
contexts as well.  For instance, theoretical frameworks that explain knowledge sharing in virtual teams or communities of 
interest can be improved by incorporating aspects of the governance concept.  Second, we advance the theoretical 
frameworks in the areas of knowledge contribution and knowledge reuse by suggesting new main and moderating effects that 
can increase explanatory power and reconcile inconsistent findings in the literature.  
From a practical perspective, the most important implication of this study is informing organizations of two alternative modes 
of governance, and their impact on KM.  Practitioners can use the findings of this study to decide which governance 
mechanism to use, or what type of repository to design in order to maximize knowledge contribution and reuse in their 
organizations. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we draw upon the governance literature in sociology and describe 
hierarchical control and community-governance as mechanisms for solving societal problems.  In the third section, we extend 
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these two mechanisms to the context of KM and present our propositions.  In the final section, we discuss the theoretical and 
practical implications. 
SOCIETAL GOVERNANCE 
Kooiman and Bavinck (2005) define governance as “the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal 
problems and create societal opportunities” (p.17).  According to this conceptualization, governance can be considered 
“arrangements” (or mechanisms) that can solve problems faced by a group of individuals, collective, community, or society 
(Kooiman, 1999).  The sociological literature informs us of two such arrangements: hierarchical control, and community-
governance.  Hierarchical control represents the classical top-down approach between policy makers (i.e. state) and the ruled 
(i.e. citizens), in which state enforces rules and policies on citizens to provide services.  It is in the best interest of citizens to 
abide by the rules, because failure to do so can result in punishment.  State’s coercion of policies is legitimate, and performed 
by civil servants.  The fundamental motivations of civil servants to enforce these policies are career advancement and 
bureaucratic stability provided by the state.  Hierarchical control can be successful if state provides its citizens with security, 
equal and predictable treatment, and efficient mobilization of resources (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985).    
The second mode of governance is community-governance, where citizens take care of themselves and solve problems on 
their own rather than relying on state.  Community-governance is implemented via individuals’ autonomous and voluntary 
efforts to deal with societal problems.  As community-governance takes advantage of the information dispersed among 
citizens, it is less susceptible to the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that plague hierarchical control (Bowles 
and Gintis, 2002).  Community-governance is usually preferred over hierarchical control if the context is diverse, complex, 
and dynamic (Kooiman, 1999), because, in such a context, there is no single person, group, or organization that has the 
power, authority, knowledge, or resources to solve problems (Bryson and Crosby, 1993).  Kooiman (1999) states that 
community-governance requires three essential components: images, instruments, and actions.  Images represent the “guiding 
light” of governance (e.g., a shared goal), and concern individuals’ visions, knowledge, facts, judgments, ends, goals, etc.  
Instruments are tools that enable individuals to enact their images.  They can be either “soft” (such as information, peer 
pressure, bribe, etc.), or “hard” (such as covenants, agreements, etc.).  Actions are putting instruments into effect, and thereby 
implementing images. 
GOVERNANCE IN KNOWLEDGE MANAGENT 
The concept of governance is relevant to the management of knowledge repositories because managing the quality of 
knowledge assets and increasing their value are salient “problems” that can be solved using hierarchical control and/or 
community-governance.  In this context, hierarchical control corresponds to expert-governance, where experts or supervisors 
act as referees, and accept or reject individual contributions to a knowledge repository.  If submissions are not up to par, 
experts may require authors to revise their submissions, or edit the submissions themselves before publishing them in the 
repository.  In doing so, experts exert political or knowledge power on individual contributors.  Any revisions to published 
content can also be subjected to a similar process, where experts or supervisors evaluate change requests and allow changes 
that are deemed necessary.  From a design perspective, the technology behind refereed repositories is geared toward storing 
and disseminating knowledge, while relying heavily on experts’ editing/control processes to ensure the quality of information 
in these repositories.   
Alternatively, organizations may employ community-governance, where a community of users may autonomously and 
voluntarily signal the quality of knowledge assets by reviewing, rating, and editing existing content.  The design of such 
repositories is fundamentally different from that of an expert-governed repository in that community-governed repositories 
must provide technological features allowing a wide range of users to review, edit, and rate existing content.  These features 
enable bi-directional information flow between the repository and the community of users.  Therefore, the repository not only 
stores and disseminates knowledge assets, but also accepts inputs from the community.  This discussion leads us to propose 
two somewhat intuitive propositions that still warrant empirical investigation:  
P1a: Expert governance increases the quality of knowledge assets in organizational knowledge repositories. 
P1b: Community governance increases the quality of knowledge assets in organizational knowledge repositories.  
Which governance mechanism is preferred and when? 
Although both governance mechanisms are currently in use within organizations, industry reports suggest that there is a trend 
toward community-governance, implemented through technologies such as blogs and wikis (McKinsey, 2008).  However, 
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current literature doesn’t provide any guidance on which governance mechanism is more effective and under what 
circumstances.  In order to answer this question, we examine two guiding principles in the governance literature.  
The first principle relates to the knowledge sharing context.  Sociologists have argued that when the context is dynamic, 
complex, and diverse, hierarchical control is likely to fail as no single person, group, or organization is likely to have the 
necessary power, authority, knowledge, or resources to solve the complex problems of a diverse group (Bryson and Crosby, 
1993; Kooiman, 1999).  Within a KM context, the diversity, complexity, and dynamism of organizational processes may 
render experts’ knowledge inadequate to evaluate knowledge contributions, and no single expert or group of experts are 
likely to have the knowledge or resources to maintain knowledge assets of the highest quality.  This, in turn, may lead to 
publishing inaccurate or outdated information, or rejecting valuable information, which can dissuade knowledge workers to 
use knowledge repositories.  Under such circumstances, the diverse knowledge base of a large community is better suited for 
ensuring the quality of knowledge assets.  This leads us to propose: 
P2: When the context is diverse, complex, and dynamic, community-governance is more effective than expert-
governance in ensuring the quality of knowledge assets. 
Second, the information culture within an organization can predispose an organization to a specific governance mechanism.  
Information culture is an organizational norm that represents employees’ values and attitudes toward information (Davenport, 
1997), and can either be open or closed.  An open information culture promotes unrestricted flow of information among 
employees, whereas a closed information culture discourages information flow as information is seen as a source of power 
(Davenport, 1997; Davenport and Prusak, 1998).  An organization with an open information culture should be more receptive 
to community-governance as employees are more likely to share knowledge and review, edit, and rate existing knowledge 
assets.  On the other hand, expert-governance may be more effective for organizations with closed information culture where 
employees would not share knowledge or review, edit, and rate knowledge assets anyway. This leads us to propose: 
P3: Community governance is more effective within organizations with open information culture, whereas expert-
governance is more effective in those with closed information culture. 
Impact of governance mechanisms on knowledge contribution  
Knowledge contribution is critical for the success of any KM initiative, because if employees do not contribute to a 
knowledge repository, it is not possible to enjoy the benefits of KM in the first place (Ba et al., 2001; Kankanhalli, Tan and 
Wei, 2005).  For this reason, many studies in the literature have attempted to identify determinants that are salient to 
increasing knowledge contribution behaviors.  Many of these suggested determinants are rooted in social capital theory (e.g., 
Chiu, Hsu and Wang, 2006; Wasko and Faraj, 2005), task-technology fit theory (e.g., Lin and Huang, 2008), collective effort 
model (e.g., Cosley, Frankowski, Kiesler, Terveen and Riedl, 2005), social exchange theory (e.g., Cummings, Butler and 
Kraut, 2002; Jarvenpaaa and Staples, 2000; Kankanhalli et al., 2005; Koh, Kim, Butler and Bock, 2007; Constant, Kiesler 
and Sproull, 1994), theory of planned behaviors (and its variants, e.g., Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2002; Bock, Zmud, Kim and 
Lee, 2005; Chow and Chan, 2008; Dholakia, Bagozzi and Pearo, 2004), expectancy theory (e.g., Kalman, Monge, Fulk and 
Heino, 2002), and expectation-confirmation theory (e.g., Chen, 2007).  However, none of the studies in the literature have 
considered governance as an antecedent of knowledge contribution.   
Governance mechanisms may play an important role in shaping users’ knowledge contribution behaviors as contributors are 
subjected to the evaluative processes of experts or supervisors (in expert-governance), or their community of peers (in 
community-governance).  Social psychology literature suggests that others’ evaluations can be a salient determinant of 
individuals’ behaviors (Brockner, 1988; Jones, 1973; Sweeney and Wells, 1990).  If others’ evaluations of one’s actions are 
favorable, the individual tends to continue performing the action, and possibly, even more frequently (Sweeney and Wells, 
1990).  In contrast, if one’s action is evaluated unfavorably by others, his/her self-esteem determines future behaviors 
(Brockner, 1988; Jones, 1973).  Brockner (1988) defines self-esteem as a trait that refers to “individuals’ degree of liking or 
disliking for themselves” and goes on to state that “the essence of self-esteem is the favorability of individuals’ characteristic 
self-evaluations” (p.11).  If one is low in self-esteem, others’ unfavorable evaluations may induce the individual to distance 
himself/herself from the target behavior and may even cause him/her to exhibit aversive behaviors.  Therefore, low self-
esteem individuals will be less likely to make future contributions to repositories if their contributions are evaluated 
unfavorably by experts or community of users.  This discussion leads us to propose: 
P4a: Experts’ favorable evaluations to prior contributions increase users’ future contributions to expert-governed 
repositories. 
P4b: Experts’ unfavorable evaluations to prior contributions decrease users’ future contributions to expert-
governed repositories if users are low in self-esteem. 
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P5a: Favorable reviews, edits, and ratings to prior contributions increase users’ future contributions to community-
governed repositories. 
P5b: Unfavorable reviews, edits, and ratings to prior contributions decrease users’ future contributions to 
community-governed repositories if users are low in self-esteem. 
A more interesting question regarding knowledge contributions is which governance mechanism induces individuals to make 
more contributions.  The answer lies in the individuals’ innate propensity to maintain a positive self esteem (Brockner, 1988; 
Leary, Tambor, Terdal and Downs, 1995).  It is argued that individuals, by their nature, seek situations that boost their self-
esteem, and avoid situations or actions that lower their self-esteem.  In expert-governance, individuals’ self-esteem can be 
threatened if they think that experts or supervisors may perceive their contribution as incompetent or rate their performance 
poorly.  This, in turn, can prevent one from making contributions to expert-governed repositories.  However, the threats are 
more severe in community-governance as the entire community of users (as opposed to a handful of experts) can perceive the 
contributor as incompetent.  This time, one’s self-esteem in the eyes of the entire community of users is on the line.  
Therefore, individuals can be less willing to make contributions to community-governed repositories as being perceived as 
incompetent by the entire community of peers is more damaging to self-esteem than being perceived as incompetent by only 
a few experts.  This leads us to propose: 
P6: Users are less likely to make contributions to community-governed repositories than expert-governed 
repositories.   
Impact of governance mechanisms on knowledge reuse 
Governance mechanisms not only influence users’ contributions to knowledge repositories, but also influence their reuse of 
knowledge in such repositories.  Studying knowledge reuse is crucial, because organizational KM initiatives are futile if 
knowledge workers do not reuse knowledge assets in their everyday tasks (Ba et al., 2001; Markus, 2001).   
Current literature on knowledge reuse draws primarily upon the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty and Cacioppo, 
1986) to understand the factors that determine knowledge reuse (e.g., Dijkstra, 1999; Fadel, Durcikova and Cha, 2008; Mak, 
Schmitt and Lyytinen, 1997; Sussman and Siegal, 2003; Zhang and Watts, 2008).  These studies suggest that knowledge 
reuse is a function of information quality (i.e., central route) and source credibility (i.e. peripheral route), contingent upon 
knowledge worker’s expertise and involvement in the subject matter (i.e., elaboration likelihood).   
Of these constructs, source credibility is problematic in both governance mechanisms for two reasons.  First, the ability of 
knowledge repositories to transcend locality and reach out to wider audiences reduces the likelihood that individuals know 
each other and have judgments about each others’ credibility.  Second, the notion that content is governed by experts or a 
community of users can reduce the salience of source credibility.  For instance, experts’ or user community’s involvement in 
the processes by which contributed information is vetted, edited, and formatted can induce individuals to consider the 
credibility of expert-governance or community-governance rather than source credibility.  Inconsistent empirical findings 
reported in the literature provide support for this argument.  Studies that investigate non-refereed information – such as the 
ones provided in emails or discussion forums – find source credibility to be significant (Sussman and Siegal, 2003; Zhang 
and Watts, 2008), while studies that investigate refereed repositories find it to be non-significant (Boh, 2008; Fadel et al., 
2008).  Therefore, if individuals have confidence in expert-governance, they may reuse a knowledge asset even if it comes 
from a less credible source.  Similarly, reusing knowledge from community-governed repositories may induce individuals to 
take into account the intellectual capital of the community.  Consequently, if an individual has confidence in community’s 
intellectual capital, she may be more likely to reuse knowledge.  Therefore, we propose:  
P7: Confidence in expert-governance positively impacts knowledge reuse from expert-governed repositories. 
P8: Confidence in the community’s intellectual capital positively impacts knowledge reuse from community-
governed repositories. 
While reusing knowledge from community-governed repositories, actions of the community of users are also important.  As 
mentioned earlier, actions are putting instruments (i.e., reviewing, editing, and rating) into use.  Actions can inform 
individuals of the quality of knowledge assets and promote knowledge reuse.  For instance, if a knowledge asset is edited by 
many users (many of whom may be potential experts), individuals can be more likely to have faith in and reuse that 
knowledge.  Similarly, individuals are more likely to reuse a knowledge asset if it receives favorable reviews and ratings 
from the community of users.  These expectations lead us to propose: 
P9: The extent to which a knowledge asset is edited is positively related to knowledge reuse from community-
governed repositories  
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P10: The favorableness of reviews and ratings is positively related to knowledge reuse from community-governed 
repositories  
Reusing knowledge from community-governed repositories may also depend on the intellectual capital of the community and 
the community’s actions.  For instance, if the community’s actions are inadequate, the mere existence of intellectual capital 
alone may not be adequate to induce individual users to reuse knowledge.  Similarly, if individuals lack confidence in the 
community’s intellectual capital, they can reuse knowledge only to a limited extent if they solely take community’s actions 
into account.  This suggests a moderating relationship, where knowledge reuse depends on the interaction between 
intellectual capital and actions.  Therefore we propose: 
P11: Community’s intellectual capital positively moderates the relationship between community’s actions and 
knowledge reuse from community-governed repositories 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this study was to investigate different approaches to managing knowledge assets in knowledge repositories.  
Specifically, we investigated two research questions: (1) which governance mechanism is preferred and when; and (2) how 
do governance mechanisms impact knowledge contribution and reuse?  To answer the first question, we started with the 
literature on governance to understand the two different governance mechanisms employed to solve societal problems.  Then, 
we extended these mechanisms to the context of KM to understand how organizations solve the problem of managing their 
knowledge assets in knowledge repositories.  Our discussion revealed two conditions that help determine which governance 
mechanism to choose: the complexity, dynamism, and diversity of the context; and the information culture.  We argued that if 
the context is complex, dynamic, and diverse, community-governance can be more preferable to increase the quality of 
knowledge assets.  We also proposed that an open information culture favors the use of community-governance, whereas a 
closed information culture favors the use of expert-governance. 
Our investigation of the second research question showed that governance mechanisms can have different effects of 
knowledge contribution and reuse.  For knowledge contribution, since both governance mechanisms evaluate individuals’ 
contributions, negative evaluations are likely to inhibit contribution behaviors especially if contributors are low in self-
esteem.  We also proposed that individuals will be less likely to contribute to community-governed repositories, since 
negative evaluations of the community of users pose a greater threat to self-esteem.  For knowledge reuse, we proposed that 
source credibility, as identified in the prior literature, is less salient for both governance mechanisms.  Instead, individuals are 
more likely to take into consideration the efficacy of expert-governance and community’s intellectual capital.  Further, we 
suggested that the way the community of users enact their goals using governance instruments can impact knowledge reuse.   
As the next step of our research, we are designing an empirical study to test the propositions discussed above.  The study will 
be conducted at a major consulting firm located in the southeastern United States that has implemented expert-governance 
and community-governance in two separate knowledge repositories.  In the first repository, experiences and lessons 
submitted by consultants are vetted, edited, and controlled by in-house experts, while in the second repository, similar 
knowledge assets are maintained in a community wiki that is rated, reviewed, and edited by the consultant community at 
large.  Both repositories are available to all consultants, and their usage is voluntary.  This “natural control” provides us a 
unique opportunity to make comparisons between the two governance mechanisms, understand the conditions that make 
them more preferable, and study consultants’ contribution to and reuse from these repositories.  When completed, this study 
will be one of the first studies to empirically examine the role of governance mechanisms within the context of KM in 
organizations. 
This study has two theoretical implications.  First, we introduce the concept of governance to the KM literature.  Governance 
helps us understand how organizations can render their knowledge assets more valuable, thereby promote knowledge 
contribution and reuse.  Although the governance mechanisms discussed in this paper are not new, their role within the 
context of knowledge contribution and reuse has not been previously explored in the KM literature.  The concept of 
governance may also be important for other contexts such as virtual teams or communities of interest, which increasingly rely 
on electronic repositories to exchange knowledge.   
Second, we propose new explanations for knowledge contribution and reuse based on the concept of governance.  Despite 
many attempts in the literature, there is still a great deal of unexplained variance for both knowledge contribution and reuse.  
The constructs and concepts discussed in this paper have the potential to reconcile some of the inconsistent findings in the 
literature, create new directions for research, and increase the explanatory power of existing theoretical frameworks.   
An important practical implication of this paper is that we inform organizations of two mechanisms that help manage 
knowledge assets in knowledge repositories.  Organizations can easily manipulate the technological features of their 
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repositories to implement one of the two mechanisms (or hybrid solutions) in an effort to increase the quality of their 
knowledge assets, and thus, promote KM.  Since many KM initiatives rely on either expert or community-governance, a lack 
of understanding of these mechanisms or their ramifications can easily undermine organizations’ efforts, and inhibit KM 
initiatives.  
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